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Abstract 
  Fraud is an increasingly expensive cost to the health care industry, and the regulatory and 
prosecutorial focus during the fast few decades have focused on health care fraud by 
pharmaceutical manufacturers. This paper provides an overview of the current statutory and 
judicial environment. First, it examines some of the industry practices for which pharmaceutical 
companies may be held liable for fraud (as well as some of the reasons these practices are 
problematic). It then gives an overview of the dual regime of the Medicare and Medicaid Anti-
Kickback Statute and the False Claims Act (“FCA”), as well as some of the other guidance 
documents available to pharmaceutical manufacturers. It also explores the relevant case history 
that has shaped liability—for health care providers and suppliers in general and for drug 
companies in particular—under the Anti-Kickback Statute and the FCA. The 2009 settlement 
between Pfizer and the government provides a useful example of the present state of affairs for 
pharmaceutical companies. Finally, the paper concludes with a brief overview of the Medicare 
Part D prescription drug benefit (and the newly implemented coverage gap discount program), 
which may result in increasing liability for pharmaceutical manufacturers in the future. 
 1 
I.  Introduction 
  In the late hours of Friday, April 9, 2011, congressional leaders approved a last-minute 
budget agreement to keep the federal government running for the remainder of the fiscal year.
1 
Republicans and Democrats finally compromised after weeks of back-and-forth to cut 
approximately $37.8 billion from the budget.
2 The cuts came from a number of programs across 
the federal government, such as a compensation fund for victims of crime, a health care program 
for children in low-income families, community health centers, high-speed rail, and the 
Corporation for Public Broadcasting, which supports NPR and PBS.
3 
  The $37.8 billion budget cuts reluctantly agreed to by members of Congress are just over 
$36 billion, which is the estimated amount that health care fraud costs American taxpayers each 
year.
4 That is based on estimates by the National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association 
(“NCHAA”) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation that fraud accounts for three to ten percent 
of total health care expenditures.
5 The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) 
estimates that by the year 2018, health care spending will reach $4.4 trillion, accounting for 20.3 
percent of GDP.
6 Furthermore, the Medicare and Medicaid programs are the largest single 
purchaser of health care worldwide.
7 Thus, the federal budget is impacted when Medicare or 
Medicaid are overcharged or billed for goods or services that were never provided. 
                                                        
1 Paul Kane et al., Government Shutdown Averted: Congress Agrees To Budget Deal, Stopgap Funding, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 9, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/reid-says-impasse-based-on-abortion-funding-boehner-
denies-it/2011/04/08/AFO40U1C_story.html. 
2 Id. 
3 House Republicans Release Details of Last-Minute Budget Deal, PBS, Apr. 12, 2011, 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2011/04/details-of-budget-deal-to-avert-government-shutdown-
released.html. 
4 Bria N. DeSalvo et al., Health Care Fraud, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 681, 683 (2010). 
5 See id.; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2009 Financial Crimes Report, http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/ 
publications/financial-crimes-report-2009/financial-crimes-report-2009; National Health Care Anti-Fraud 
Association, The Problem of Health Care Fraud, http://www.nhcaa.org/eweb/DynamicPage.aspx?webcode=anti_ 
fraud_resource_centr&wpscode=TheProblemOfHCFraud. 
6 See DeSalvo et al., supra note 4, at 683. 
7 See DeSalvo et al., supra note 4, at 683. 2 
  This paper will focus on fraud within one subset of the health care industry, but one that 
has become increasingly important in recent years: pharmaceutical manufacturers. It will first 
discuss some of the traditional industry practices for which pharmaceutical companies may be 
held liable for fraud (as well as some of the reasons these practices are problematic). It will then 
provide an overview of the current statutory regime regulating the industry, specifically the 
Medicare and Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute and the False Claims Act (“FCA”), and the non-
statutory guidance promulgated by Congress and the Department of Health and Human Services 
Office of the Inspector General (“HHS OIG”). Next it will review the relevant case history that 
has shaped drug company liability under the Anti-Kickback Statute and the FCA, looking in 
particular at the fairly recent settlement between Pfizer and the government. Finally, it will look 
at some implications for pharmaceutical manufacturer liability in the future as the Medicare Part 
D prescription drug benefit is fully implemented. 
II.  Pharmaceutical Manufacturer Practices 
  A series of congressional hearings by Senator Ted Kennedy in 1990 perhaps first raised 
public interest in the promotional practices of prescription drug companies and were likely an 
impetus for American Medical Association (“AMA”) guidelines on receipt of gifts and benefits 
from drug manufacturers.
8 A few years later, in its 1994 Prescription Drug Marketing Fraud 
Alert, the HHS OIG noted that the increase in drug marketing may interfere with the traditional 
                                                        
8 See Thomas N. Bulleit, Jr. & Joan H. Krause, Kickbacks, Courtesies or Cost-Effectiveness?: Application of the 
Medicare Antikickback Law to the Marketing and Promotional Practices of Drug and Medical Device 
Manufacturers, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 279, 296–97. (1999). Among other things, the guidelines at the time provided 
that physicians should accept only gifts that primarily benefit patients and that are not of substantive value (such as 
textbooks and modest educational meals). Id. They could similarly accept gifts of minimal value related to the 
physician’s work (such as pens and notepads). Id. Subsidies for CME and professional meetings were appropriate if 
paid to the sponsor of the event, not the individual physicians. Id. Travel expenses were not appropriate, except for 
the faculty of events or for students and researchers. Id. Physicians could be reimbursed for genuine consulting 
services. Id. The current version of the guidelines is now part of the AMA Code of Medical Ethics. American 
Medical Association, Ethical Guidelines for Gifts to Physicians from Industry, http://www.ama-3 
roles of physician and pharmacist.
9 The ways in which pharmaceutical companies use their 
marketing budgets draws attention because the amounts of money are so large. For example, in 
2000, it was estimated that more than $11 billion was spent each year by pharmaceutical 
companies in promoting and marketing, $5 billion of which went to sales representatives.
10 It 
was estimated that $8,000 to $13,000 was spent each year per physician.
11 The public scrutiny 
has continued in recent years, for example, when Senator Chuck Grassley and the Senate Finance 
Committee led an investigation into pharmaceutical industry funding of CME programs in 
2006.
12 
  Pharmaceutical manufacturers thus currently navigate a tricky environment. One drug 
company employee commented, “Health care is the only industry in America where it’s against 
the law to be nice to your customers.”
13 At the same time, manufacturers are pushed by the 
current economics of the health care system to demonstrate that their products are cost-effective 
as they try to sell more of their products than their competitors.
14 The past two decades have seen 
an increased focus on holding drug companies liable for various activities that had long been 
standard industry practice, such as providing gifts to health care providers, sponsoring 
Continuing Medical Education (“CME”) programs, and paying health care providers to provide 
consulting or advisory services. There has also been intensified scrutiny of industry marketing of 
“off-label” uses of drugs and the methods manufacturers use to report prices to physicians and to 
the federal health care programs. 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/about-ethics-group/ethics-resource-center/educational-
resources/guidelines-gifts-physicians.page?. 
9 Publication of OIG Special Fraud Alerts, 59 Fed. Reg. 65,372, 65,376 (Dec. 19, 1994). 
10 See Ashley Wazana, Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Is a Gift Ever Just a Gift?, 283 JAMA 373, 373 
(2000). 
11 See id. 
12 Linda Pissott Reig et al., Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Off-Label Communications in an Era of Clinical 
Trial Registries, Continuing Medical Education, RA FOCUS, Nov. 2006, at 8, 9–10. 
13 Bulleit & Krause, supra note 8, at 279. 4 
A.  Gifts and Direct Marketing to Health Care Providers 
  Physicians’ interactions with the pharmaceutical industry begin as early as medical 
school and continue throughout their careers.
15 Residents and physicians generally believe that 
pharmaceutical representatives provide them with accurate information about their drugs, but 
they also believe that representatives prioritize product promotion above patient welfare.
16 Gifts 
and business courtesies for health care providers can generally be divided into the categories of 
personal gifts (meals, tickets to sporting events, etc.), practice aids (pens, calendars, textbooks, 
etc.), and gifts with features of both (subsidies for professional education, payments for 
consulting services, etc.).
17 
  Drug companies know how to spend their money well. For example, Michael A. 
Steinman et al. undertook a review of the documents involved in a suit regarding the off-label 
marketing of Neurontin by Pfizer and its subsidiaries.
18 Among their other findings, the authors 
noted that Pfizer’s marketing expenses included explicit targeting of physicians who frequently 
prescribed anti-convulsants like Neurontin, physicians who had the potential to influence their 
colleagues, influential physicians at academic medical centers, and residents.
19 
  There are implications to gift giving in the health care industry. On a common sense 
level, drug companies would not give away their shareholders’ money purely out of disinterested 
generosity—there is clearly a benefit to them. Mary-Margaret Chren et al. note that there are at 
least three major effects of gift giving (independent of any ethical repercussions.
20 First, gifts 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
14 See Bulleit & Krause, supra note 8, at 319. 
15 See Wazana, supra note 10, at 375. 
16 See Wazana, supra note 10, at 375. 
17 Bulleit & Krause, supra note 8, at 302–03. 
18 Michael A. Steinman et al., The Promotion of Gabapentin: An Analysis of Internal Industry Documents, 145 
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 284 (2006). The case, United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39 
(D. Mass. 2001), is discussed in further detail in Part V, infra. 
19 Id. at 285. 
20 Mary-Margaret Chren et al., Doctors, Drug Companies, and Gifts, 262 JAMA 3448, 3449 (1989). 5 
cost money, and cost is ultimately passed on to patients without their explicit knowledge, since 
many gifts are private and not visible to patients like many other forms of advertising.
21 Second, 
physicians’ acceptance of gifts may (further) erode the perception that the medical profession 
serves the best interests of patients.
22 Third, the acceptance of a gift establishes or reinforces a 
relationship between the donor and the recipient, which triggers social duties and obligations 
such as grateful conduct and use and potentially reciprocation.
23 Ironically, formal contracts 
between a buyer and seller can be easily fulfilled or dissolved, but the relationship between the 
giver and receiver of a gift is less well defined and often endures.
24 
B.  Continuing Medical Education Sponsorship 
  Continuing medical education is closely linked with the marketing of pharmaceuticals. 
Although representatives of the drug companies claim they simply want to generate goodwill and 
name recognition, the pharmaceutical industry does provide a substantial portion of the billions 
of the dollars spent on CME annually.
25 Pharmaceutical companies may organize and advertise 
the educational event, prepare teaching slides and curriculum materials, and compile lists of 
possible speakers.
26 Companies often organize teaching conferences in community hospitals.
27 
Sales representatives are allowed to promote the company’s products at or adjacent to the 
educational sessions.
28 There are also increasing numbers of for-profit medical education and 
communication companies, which put together educational programs and are paid mainly by 
                                                        
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Arnold S. Relman, Separating Continuing Medical Education from Pharmaceutical Marketing, 285 JAMA 2009, 
2009 (2001). 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 6 
pharmaceutical companies.
29 In their study, Steinman et al. found that professional education 
funding accounted for half to two thirds of the projected Neurontin promotional budgets for 1996 
through 1998.
30 Educational activities included teleconferences with paid physician moderators, 
speakers’ bureaus and lecture series, and unrestricted grants to medical education and 
communication companies.
31 
C.  Payments for Services 
  Pharmaceutical companies frequently contract with physicians and other health care 
providers to provide consulting services, serve on advisory boards, and even conduct additional 
clinical studies. For example, Steinman, et al., noted a number of expenses related to “services” 
provided by physicians.
32 While explicitly seeking feedback from physicians on their advisory 
boards, Pfizer also gave them honoraria and paid their food, travel and lodging expenses.
33 They 
viewed publication as a way to stimulate excitement about off-label uses of Neurontin, and there 
was some intention that they wanted to publish only favorable results.
34 Correspondingly, many 
companies gave incentives to pharmacists for convincing physicians to switch patients to their 
drug or for providing patients with instructions on use of their drug (pharmacists are legally and 
ethically obligated to provide patient counseling).
35 
  Steinman, et al., also noticed that Pfizer provided funding for an uncontrolled, open-label 
study in patients with epilepsy, in which physicians were instructed to increase the dosage until 
patients were seizure-free or at a maximum twice the FDA-approved level.
36 Unless the FDA has 
asked for additional research, clinical studies for products that have already received FDA 
                                                        
29 Id. 
30 Steinman et al., supra note 18, at 285. 
31 Steinman et al., supra note 18, at 286–88. 
32 Steinman et al., supra note 18, at 288–90. 
33 Steinman et al., supra note 18, at 288. 
34 Steinman et al., supra note 18, at 288. 
35 See Bulleit & Krause, supra note 8, at 312. 7 
market clearance raise suspicion because they are not strictly necessary and may result in the use 
of products where not medically indicated.
37 
  Among the problems of health care fraud, such as payments for services or clinical 
studies, are the conflicts of interest that it creates. A conflict of interest can be considered as a set 
of conditions in which professional judgment concerning a primary interest (such as patient 
welfare or the validity of research) tends to be unduly influenced by a secondary interest (such as 
personal financial gain).
38 In the realm of clinical studies, although the FDA has some guidelines 
requiring disclosure of investigator conflicts of interest, physicians may underestimate the extent 
to which they are influenced.
39 A survey of San Francisco area physicians revealed that 85% of 
those surveyed felt participation in AIDS medication clinical trials would not adversely affect the 
doctor-patient relationship, and 84% did not believe there was a conflict between the role of 
physician and researcher.
40 
D.  “Marketing the Spread” 
  There has been a lot of scrutiny of pharmaceutical companies for inflating the prices 
reported in the Average Wholesale Price (“AWP”), which is used by a number of government 
agencies in determining reimbursement rates.
41 For example, as of the 2003 Medicare 
Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act, the reimbursement rate for Medicare 
Part B drugs was set at 85 percent of AWP in 2004.
42 Contractors base their rates on the 
information in the pharmaceutical pricing publications and databases, which receive their 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
36 Steinman et al., supra note 18, at 289–90. 
37 See Bulleit & Krause, supra note 8, at 307. 
38 See Kevin W. Williams, Managing Physician Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Trials Conducted in the Private 
Practice Setting, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 45, 56 (2004). 
39 Id. at 52–53. 
40 Id. at 65. 
41 Joan H. Krause, A Conceptual Model of Health Care Fraud Enforcement, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 55, 123–24 (2003). 
42 See id. at 124. 8 
information directly from the manufacturers.
43 However, the published prices often do not reflect 
the actual price at which physicians and hospitals can purchase products because manufacturers 
will frequently offer volume discounts and purchasing incentives.
44 AWP is jokingly known in 
the drug industry as “Ain’t What’s Paid.”
45 Part of this problem is the lack of a standard 
definition of AWP. No federal statute defines it, and Redbook and First Data Bank, the reporting 
agencies upon which the state programs rely, do not publish a standard definition.
46 The 
commonly accepted definition is the manufacturer’s “suggested retail pharmacy price,” but 
certain products, like drugs sold directly to patients or hospitals, are not distributed through 
wholesalers and cannot be priced this way.
47 
  The government’s attempts to control AWP reporting have been ongoing for decades. In 
1974, the government sought to limit the prices paid to pharmacists under Medicaid, noting, 
“The Department recognizes that published wholesale prices for drugs […] are frequently higher 
than prices actually paid by providers.”
48 In 1991, HHS noted that the Red Book (one of the 
main compendia used by the government agencies to calculate rates) overstated the actual 
prices.
49 The government again observed the problems of marketing the spread in 2003.
50 It 
noted, “For a few drugs, the ‘spread’ is so large that the amount that the Medicare beneficiary 
pays the physician or supplier for coinsurance is greater than the physician or supplier's payment 
to acquire the drug.”
51 
                                                        
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Paul E. Kalb et al., The Average Wholesale Price: It “Ain’t What the Government Wants to Pay”, BNA HEALTH 
CARE FRAUD REPORT, Feb. 21, 2001. 
46 See id. 
47 See id. 
48 Maximum Allowable Cost for Drugs, 39 Fed. Reg. 40,302, 40,303 (Nov. 15, 1974). 
49 See Krause, supra note 41, at 126. 
50 Payment Reform for Part B Drugs, 68 Fed. Reg. 50,428, 50,429–30 (Aug. 20, 2003). 
51 Id. at 50,430. The example given was for leucovorin calcium, which at the time had a list AWP of $18.44 but was 
widely available at a market price of $2.77. Id. Since the Medicare payment was 95 percent of the list AWP 9 
  The government made several attempts to revise the calculations of AWP to little avail. 
In 1997, an attempt to revise the AWP failed when Congress could not reach a consensus.
52 One 
main reason was strong opposition from the oncology lobby, who argued that the higher 
reimbursement rates for drugs helped offset the storage and administering costs.
53 In May 2000, 
the National Association of Medicaid Fraud Control Units ordered First Data Bank (the reporting 
service on which Medicaid agencies generally rely) to stop reporting the AWP published by the 
pharmaceutical industry and to instead use the market prices for approximately 50 drug and 
biologic products.
54 The AWP calculated with a survey of wholesale catalog prices was 50 or 60 
percent lower than the AWP published by manufacturers.
55 HCFA issued a memo to its 
contractors announcing the alternative source of AWP, but two months later instructed the 
contractors not to use the new AWP in calculating reimbursement.
56 
  Current OIG guidance states that it is illegal for a manufacturer knowingly to establish or 
inappropriately maintain a particular AWP if one purpose is to manipulate the spread or induct 
customers to purchase its product.
57 The OIG has indicated that the conjunction of manipulation 
of AWP to induct customers to purchase with active marketing of the spread is strong evidence 
of the unlawful intent necessary to trigger the Anti-Kickback Statute.
58 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
($17.52), the beneficiary’s Part B 20 percent coinsurance was $3.69. Id. Thus, the beneficiary was paying more in 
coinsurance than the physician was paying to actually purchase the drug. Id. 
52 See Krause, supra note 41, at 127. 
53 See Krause, supra note 41, at 127–28. 
54 See Kalb et al., supra note 45. 
55 See Kalb et al., supra note 45. 
56 See Krause, supra note 41, at 126–27. 
57 OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fed. Reg. 23,731, 23,737 (May 5, 
2003). 
58 Id. Some of the Corporate Integrity Agreements negotiated by OIG at the settlement of fraud claims related to 
AWP require manufacturers to report their average sales price (“ASP”) on a regular basis. See Grant Bagley et al., 
The Bayer CIA: A Glimpse Into the Future of Pharmaceutical Reimbursements, BNA HEALTH CARE FRAUD 
REPORT, Apr. 18, 2001; Krause, supra note 41, at 128–29. For example, a CIA negotiated by Bayer and the OIG 
required Bayer to submit quarterly reports on the ASP for its government reimbursed drugs to state and federal 
officials. See Bagley et al., supra. The CIA defined ASP as the average of all final sales prices charged by Bayer 
excluding those also excluded from the calculation of “Best Price” for Medicaid rebate purposes and direct sales to 10 
E.  Off-Label Marketing 
  A number of the recent cases against pharmaceutical manufacturers have involved illegal 
“off-label” marketing of drugs. Although this paper does not delve into all the intricacies of the 
restrictions on off-label marketing, it is a highly contested area that has resulted in extensive 
liability for drug companies. The Food Drug & Cosmetic Act (“FD&C”) prohibits the sale of any 
drug unless the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) has approved a new drug application (or 
an abbreviated application for biosimilars).
59 Furthermore, the FD&C prohibits the sale of 
“misbranded” drugs.
60 It requires that the drug be properly labeled, and labeling includes 
advertising.
61 A manufacturer cannot advertise a drug for any use for which an application was 
not approved under section 355(a) or (j).
62 
  The FDA requires that prescription drug advertising be “fairly balanced,” presenting both 
the benefits and risks of the drug, that it must not contain any claims other than those approved 
by the FDA and including in the product’s labeling.
63 However, the FDA does not require 
preapproval for drug advertisements—they must simply be submitted to the FDA at the time of 
initial dissemination.
64 The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) also has a broad mandate to 
investigate any false advertisement.
65 The FTC has traditionally deferred to FDA’s specific 
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authority over prescription drug advertisement, although recently the FTC has broadened its 
enforcement to pharmaceutical marketing practices generally.
66 
  This area is somewhat distinct from the other pharmaceutical company practices 
implicated in discussions of health care fraud. Gifts to health care providers, sponsorship of 
educational programs, and payments for consulting services are potentially problematic because 
of the potential distortion of the doctor-patient (or pharmacist-patient) relationship when health 
care providers have conflicts of interest. The practice of marketing the spread also creates 
conflicts of interest for prescribing physicians, but it does so by directly (though not always 
obviously) overcharging the federal health care programs. Marketing drugs for off-label 
indications, by contrast, in theory defrauds the government by seeking payment for goods that 
would not normally be covered. This is technically possible because the Social Security Act 
definition of “covered drugs” for both the Medicare and Medicaid programs makes reference to 
FDA approval.
67 However, the statute also allows coverage for uses that are included in the 
compendia and for uses that are included in peer-reviewed literature.
68 Importantly, the FDA’s 
mission does not include the regulation of the “practice of medicine,” which has meant that 
physicians are free to prescribe drugs for any use, whether FDA-approved and listed on the label 
or not.
69 As such, suits holding pharmaceutical companies liable for the submission of claims to 
the federal health care programs are a somewhat indirect means of enforcing the FDA’s 
prohibition of off-label marketing of drugs.
70 
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III.  Overview of Statutory Regime 
  The two primary laws under which pharmaceutical companies (and often health care 
providers and suppliers in general) may be held liable for health care fraud are the Medicare and 
Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute and the False Claims Act.  There are also a few other potential 
sources of liability for companies. 
A.  Medicare & Medicaid Anti-Kickback Act 
  The Medicare and Medicaid fraud and abuse provisions are found in 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-
7b. Section 1320a-7b(b)(2) provides: 
[W]hoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any remuneration (including any 
kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind to 
any person to induce such person— 
(A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging for the furnishing 
of any item or service for which payment may be made in whole or in part under a 
Federal health care program, or 
(B) to purchase, lease, order, or arrange for or recommend purchasing, leasing, or 
ordering any good, facility, service, or item for which payment may be made in whole 
or in part under a Federal health care program, 
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than 
$25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both. 
 
(Section 1320a-7b(b)(1) provides corresponding parallel liability for anyone who “knowingly 
and willfully solicits or receives any remuneration.”) The law is enforced criminally by DOJ and 
civilly by the HHS OIG.
71 
  It is important to note that the Anti-Kickback Statute is a criminal law. The main purpose 
of the law is to prevent inappropriate financial considerations from influencing the amount or 
type of care, the cost of items or services, or the selection of the provider of care for beneficiaries 
of the federal health care programs.
72 With this in mind, the increased cost to the government is 
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not the sole criterion considered when evaluating potential anti-kickback claims. DOJ and OIG 
also consider whether an activity may freeze out competing suppliers, prevent potential price 
reductions, misdirect program funds from other purposes, or create temptations for providers to 
order more drugs or supplies than they need.
73 The law was originally about punishing truly 
corrupt behavior, but a shift in the interpretation of the statute in the mid-1980s recognized 
violations if even one purpose of a payment was to induce referrals.
74 
  The law does not prohibit just simple kickbacks, as they are commonly understood. 
“Remunerations” under the statute can include gifts and business courtesies (including grants), 
payments for services (including clinical studies), and discount arrangements (including bundled 
sales).
75 
  Section 1320a-7b(b)(3) of the statute includes a number of “safe harbors” within which 
providers or suppliers can avoid liability. A few safe harbor provisions were created in 1977, 
when Congress upgraded the penalty for violating the statute from a misdemeanor to a felony.
76 
In 1987, Congress instructed the Secretary to promulgate regulations regarding the specifics of 
the safe harbors when it also granted the OIG the authority to exclude violators of the Anti-
Kickback Statute.
77 Thus, HHS has issued detailed regulations interpreting these safe harbor 
provisions.
78 The goal of the safe harbor provisions was to “permit physicians to freely engage in 
business practices and arrangements that encourage competition, innovation and economy.”
79 In 
order for a business arrangement to comply with one of the exemptions, each provision of the 
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exemption must be met.
80 Furthermore, fully complying with an exemption does not necessarily 
guarantee complete immunity.
81 In a Federal Register Notice on January 23, 1989, the Secretary 
sought comments on proposed safe harbors relating to investment interests, space rental, 
equipment rental, personal services and management contracts, sale of practice, referral services, 
warranties, waiver of deductibles for in-patient hospital care, discounts, employment, and group 
purchasing organizations.
82 The Secretary issued the final rule on the safe harbors on July 29, 
1991, emphasizing that “the gravamen of a violation of the statute is ‘inducement’ and not 
necessarily the structure of the arrangement.”
83 
  When a particular practice does not qualify for a safe harbor, the OIG will consider the 
potential for increased charges or reported costs, possible overutilization of the item or service, 
the potential for adverse effects on competition, and the intent of the parties involved.
84 
Importantly, no one factor is dispositive, and the OIG has unlimited discretion in determining 
which cases to pursue.
85 
  In addition to the criminal penalties, the OIG can exclude providers who are convicted 
under the Anti-Kickback Statute.
86 Prior to the 1990s, the OIG said that it would not seek to 
exclude manufacturers.
87 When HHS issued its final rule regarding the OIG exclusion authority 
in 1991, it stated: 
Because the effect of exclusion is denial of payment for items or services furnished by an 
excluded individual or entity, it would be difficult to administer exclusions against 
entities which the Secretary does not directly reimburse. Thus, for the present time, to the 
extent that manufacturers, suppliers and distributors do not receive payment directly from 
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the Medicare and State health care programs for the items they supply, these regulations 
will not affect them.
88 
 
  In 1998, however, HHS changed its policy to permit exclusion for “indirectly furnishing” 
items or services under the terms of the statute.
89 When the Secretary promulgated rules updating 
the OIG’s exclusion authority under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(“HIPAA”)
90 and the Balanced Budget Act of 1997,
91 she also “proposed to clarify the current 
definition of the term ‘furnished’ in § 1000.10 to indicate that exclusions will apply to any 
individual or entity that provides or supplies items or services, directly or indirectly.”
92 The 
notice elaborated, “The term ‘indirectly’ means the provision of items and services 
manufactured, distributed or otherwise supplied by individuals or entities who do not directly 
submit claims to Medicare, Medicaid or other Federal health care programs, but that provide 
items and services to providers, practitioners or suppliers who submit claims to these programs 
for such items and services.”
93 In support of this new interpretation, the Secretary cited section 
1862(3) of the Social Security Act, which denies payment for items and services directly 
provided by an excluded individual and for those furnished at the direction or prescription of an 
excluded physician.
94 Congress had further indicated its intent when it expanded the scope of the 
exclusion authority to permit (and sometimes mandate) exclusion of a wider scope of individuals 
and entities.
95 When the Social Security Act was amended in 1980, the congressional report 
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indicated “payment would not be made to the provider for the cost of any services furnished to or 
on behalf of the provider by the convicted professional.”
96 Therefore, the HHS determined, “It is 
not appropriate to continue to exempt untrustworthy manufacturers and distributors of products 
from exclusion, when many other providers are excluded every year due to similar concerns.”
97 
B.  False Claims Act 
  The False Claims Act
98 was originally passed during the Civil War era to prevent fraud 
against the Union Army.
99 Specifically the FCA provides that anyone who commits one of the 
enumerated acts is liable to the government for civil penalties (currently between $5,000 and 
$10,000 for each violation) as well as treble damages.
100 Several of the provisions have been 
invoked in health care fraud cases. Section 3729(a)(1)(A) provides liability for anyone who 
“knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or 
approval.” Similarly, section (a)(1)(B) provides liability when anyone “knowingly makes, uses, 
or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.” 
Section (a)(1)(C) provides liability when someone “conspires to commit a violation” of one of 
the other subparagraphs, including (A) and (B). The statute defines the term “knowingly” to 
mean that “a person, with respect to information, (i) has actual knowledge of the information; (ii) 
acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or (iii) acts in reckless 
disregard of the truth or falsity of the information” and does not require specific intent.
101 
  Importantly, section 3730(b) provides for qui tam suits by private parties. An individual 
(“relator”) may bring suit in the name of the government.
102 The complaint is filed under seal, 
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and the government has the opportunity to intervene.
103 If the government intervenes and wins or 
settles the suit, the relator receives between 15 and 25 percent of the proceeds of the action or 
settlement as well as reasonable legal costs and fees.
104 If the government chooses not to 
intervene and the relator proceeds with the suit, he may receive 25 to 30 percent of the proceeds 
as well as reasonable legal costs and fees.
105 
  Some courts have allowed qui tam suits under the FCA based on the Anti-Kickback 
Statute.
106 It may be more logical to keep these two statutes distinct, however, because they each 
have a different mens rea standard—it is possible to act recklessly under the FCA without the 
willful malice required under the Anti-Kickback Statute.
107 
C.  Other Potential Sources of Liability 
  In addition to the Anti-Kickback Statute and the FCA, there are numerous state laws with 
similar provisions.
108 Additionally, the provisions of HIPAA that address “health care fraud” 
within the insurance industry are potentially implicated by drug company activities if payment 
arrangements between manufacturers and providers are hidden from insurance plans, including 
government programs.
109 The Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987
110 regulates the 
distribution of drug samples and prohibits their sale.
111 If the samples have monetary value to 
their recipient (i.e., free samples given to a physician) and are used to treat Medicare or Medicaid 
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beneficiaries, the improper use of the samples might trigger liability under the FCA and the Anti-
Kickback Statute.
112 
IV.  Guidance Documents 
  Both Congress and HHS have provided some guidance for pharmaceutical manufacturers 
(and other providers) to navigate the Anti-Kickback Statute and FCA regime. Additionally, the 
industry itself self-regulates to an extent with the guidelines published the Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association (“PhRMA”). 
  The HHS OIG has issued Special Fraud Alerts to members of the health care industry on 
a number of topics that indicate when liability may arise. Notably for drug manufacturers, in 
August 1994, OIG issued a Prescription Drug Marketing Fraud Alert.
113 It provided a number of 
examples of violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute, including “product conversion” schemes 
(providing a cash award every time pharmacists switched a patient’s prescription to the 
company’s brand, giving them an incentive to persuade physicians to change prescriptions), 
“frequent flier” programs (giving physicians air miles for filling out questionnaires for new 
patients on a particular drug), and “research grants” (in actuality payments for recordkeeping).
114 
  The Fraud Alert noted that payments may be improper if they are made to a person in a 
position to generate business for the company, if they are related to the volume of business 
generated, if they are more than nominal in value, if they are in excess of the fair market value of 
any legitimate services rendered, or if they are unrelated to any service other than patient 
referral.
115 The Fraud Alert further noted practices that might warrant further investigation by 
OIG, such as prizes, gifts, cash, or other benefits in exchange for prescribing or marketing drugs 
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(especially if based on volume), grants to providers for studies of questionable scientific value, 
and payments for changing prescriptions.
116 
  The Fraud Alert emphasized, “If one purpose of any of these marketing schemes is to 
induce the provision of a prescription drug item reimbursable by Medicaid, then the criminal 
anti-kickback statute is implicated. There is no statutory exception or "safe harbor" to protect 
such activities. Thus a physician, pharmacy or other practitioner or supplier receiving payment 
under these activities may be subject to criminal prosecution and exclusion from participation in 
the Medicare and Medicaid programs.”
117 
  In 2003, the OIG also issued compliance program guidance for pharmaceutical 
manufacturers “to encourage the use of internal controls to efficiently monitor adherence to 
applicable statutes, regulations and program requirements.”
118 The OIG noted that an effective 
compliance program could demonstrate a good faith effort to comply with the statutes and 
regulations and the federal health care program requirements and would reduce both the risk of 
illegal conduct as well as the resulting penalties.
119 
  The guidance noted seven elements that it considered “fundamental” to an effective 
compliance program: (1) implementation of written policies and procedures; (2) designation of a 
compliance officer and committee; (3) effective training and education; (4) development of 
effective lines of communication; (5) internal monitoring and auditing; (6) enforcement of 
standards through publicized disciplinary guidelines; (7) prompt responses and corrective action 
for detected problems.
120 Notably, the compliance officer’s responsibilities include overseeing 
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the implementation of the compliance program, reporting to the company’s management, 
coordinating education and training for employees, ensuring that the company does not hire or 
contract with excluded individuals, assisting the company’s internal auditors, investigating 
compliance-related issues, and reporting self-discovered violations with the company’s 
counsel.
121 
  On a related note, PhRMA publishes a “Code on Interactions with Healthcare 
Professionals,” last updated in 2008.
122 The code states that appropriate marketing of drugs 
ensures that patients have access to the products they need, and cautions that promotional 
materials given to health care providers should: “(a) be accurate and not misleading; (b) make 
claims about a product only when properly substantiated; (c) reflect the balance between risks 
and benefits; and (d) be consistent with all other [FDA] requirements governing such 
communications.”
123 The code individually addresses many of the common marketing practices 
of the pharmaceutical industry. Occasional meals may be offered as a business courtesy as long 
as they are modest, not part of an entertainment or recreational event, and provided to 
communication information.
124 Companies should separate their CME grant-making from their 
sales and marketing departments.
125 The selection and retention of health care professionals as 
consultants or speakers should be based on defined criteria, and companies should ensure that 
these arrangements are not inducements or rewards for prescribing or recommending a particular 
medicine.
126 
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  The OIG has stated that, although compliance with the PhRMA Code does not provide 
immunity, it does reduce the risk of fraud and abuse in the first place, and it helps to demonstrate 
a good faith effort to comply with the requirements of the federal health care programs.
127 
V.  Relevant Case History 
  The relevant cases involving the Anti-Kickback Statute and the FCA flesh out the scope 
of liability under the two laws. The earliest cases interpreted and developed the reach of the 
Anti-Kickback Statute, while more recent cases have explored its requisite standard of intent. 
Some cases also demonstrate the interplay between the Anti-Kickback Statute and the FCA in 
general and more specifically within the realm of prescription drugs. The treatment of medical 
device manufacturers under the Anti-Kickback Statute and the FCA also serves as a useful 
contrast. Ultimately, the most recent cases involving pharmaceutical companies have resulted in 
(large) settlements rather than judicial resolutions.
128 
  The earliest cases involving the Anti-Kickback Statute mainly focused on the 
interpretation of “any remuneration,” and the broad tack taken by most courts means that many 
of the traditional practices of the pharmaceutical industry could be implicated. In United States v. 
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Ruttenberg, the court held that all that is required to violate the Anti-Kickback Statute was 
payment of a kickback to someone in control of federal funds, which is “in violation of the duty 
imposed by Congress on providers of services to use federal funds only for intended purposes 
and only in the approved manner.”
129 In United States v. Bay State Ambulance, the court found 
that the “gravamen of Medicare Fraud is inducement,” and thus a broad interpretation of “any 
remuneration” appropriately includes even cases in which some professional services were 
performed in exchange for payment.
130 
  These early cases also emphasized that the main purpose of a payment does not need to 
be to induce a referral or purchase of goods or services. In Bay State, the court held that “the 
issue of the sole versus primary reason for payments is irrelevant since any amount of 
inducement is illegal.”
131 Additionally, the court in United States v. Greber stated, “If one 
purpose of the payment was to induce future referrals, the Medicare statute has been violated.”
132 
Thus, even if a payment to a physician was intended to compensate for professional services 
actually performed, the Anti-Kickback Statute was still violated if the payment was intended to 
induce the physician to use the company’s services.
133 
  Similarly, the early cases established that remunerations could take many forms. In 
Hanlester Network v. Shalala, the court held that proof of the existence of a referral agreement is 
not required to establish liability under the Anti-Kickback Statute.
134 The court noted, “The 
inducement to commit the violation was the bribe, i.e., the quid pro quo.”
135 The court adopted 
the Secretary’s interpretation of the phrase “to induce” as meaning “an intent to exercise 
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influence over the reason or judgment of another in an effort to cause the referral of program-
related business.”
136 Thus, an explicit agreement between providers is not required.  As the 
Departmental Appeals Board decision below had noted, “‘Remuneration’ was added to the 
statute precisely to broaden it beyond traditionally recognizable corrupt payments, such as bribes 
and kickbacks.”
137 
  Hanlester is also one of the first of several cases interpreting the requisite level of intent 
in the Anti-Kickback Statute, and there has been a Circuit split on this issue. In Hanlester, the 
Ninth Circuit construed “knowingly and willfully” to mean that the defendant must both know 
that the Act prohibits offering or paying remuneration to induce referrals and engage in the 
prohibited conduct with specific intent to disobey the law.
138 The Tenth Circuit also followed 
this higher intent standard—requiring knowing breach of a specific legal duty—in United States 
v. McClatchey.
139 
  In contrast, the Eighth Circuit held in United States v. Jain that, although the government 
must meet a heightened mens rea standard, it must only prove that the defendant knew that his 
conduct was wrongful, rather than that he knew it violated a specific legal duty.
140 The Eleventh 
Circuit also followed this reasoning in United States v. Starks, holding that “the willfulness 
requirement of [the Anti-Kickback Statute] does not carve out an exception to the traditional rule 
that ignorance of the law is no excuse; knowledge that conduct is unlawful is all that is 
required.”
141 The court felt that the Anti-Kickback Statute is not a highly technical tax or 
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financial regulation that could ensnare someone engaged in seemingly innocent conduct.
142 It 
noted that “[s]uch kickbacks are more clearly malum in se, rather than malum prohibitum.”
143 
Under either standard, however, the government must prove, at minimum, that the defendants 
have “actual” knowledge that the conduct at issue is improper (or illegal).
144 
  The interplay between the Anti-Kickback Statute and the FCA is also important when 
considering potential liability for pharmaceutical manufacturers. In United States ex rel. Pogue v. 
American Healthcorp, the plaintiff relator did not allege that the defendants overcharged 
Medicare or charged it for services that were not performed.
145 Instead, he argued that their 
failure to comply with the Medicare laws proscribing kickbacks made their Medicare claims by 
default false or fraudulent.
146 The court held that actual loss was not a necessary element of a 
FCA claim and that the relator could bring his claim under the FCA if he could show that the 
defendants’ fraudulent conduct was intended to induce government payment.
147 
  However, in United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, the court cautioned that 
violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute are not per se violations of the FCA, and Anti-Kickback 
violations are only actionable FCA claims when the claimant certified compliance with the Anti-
Kickback provisions.
148 Courts have found liability under theories of both affirmative 
certification and implied certification (in which a party certifies their compliance with 
regulations by their very participation in a federal program).
149 
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  The Second Circuit examined the certification theory of liability under the FCA in Mikes 
v. Straus.
150 The plaintiff relator alleged that the defendant had violated the FCA by submitting 
Medicare reimbursement claims for procedures that were not performed with the appropriate 
standard of care.
151 The relator’s theory of liability was based on the defendant’s false 
representation of compliance with the Medicare statutes and regulations.
152 The court contrasted 
this “legally false” certification with “factually false” certification, which would require 
inaccurate descriptions of the goods or services provided or requests for goods or services that 
were never provided.
153 The court followed the rule of the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and District of 
Columbia Circuits that a claim under the FCA is only legally false where the party certifies 
compliance with a statute or regulation as a condition to the government’s payment.
154 
  However, the plaintiffs in Mikes argued that the defendants had made impliedly false 
certifications on the theory that the act of submitting a claim for reimbursement implies 
compliance with the rules and regulations in itself.
155 The court noted that this would be 
appropriate only where the underlying statute or regulation expressly states that the provider 
must comply in order to receive reimbursement.
156 It implied that this type of liability could be 
found under the Medicare statute because it states that “no payment may be made” for goods or 
services that “are not reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis and treatment” of the illness or 
injury in question.
157 In this particular case, however, the court emphasized that reasonableness 
and necessity refers to the selection of the treatment, not the quality of its performance.
158 
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  A case involving off-label use of medical devices, rather than drugs, demonstrates some 
of the traditional differences between the two fields. In Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Shalala, 
the court evaluated the validity of a 1986 Medicare manual instruction providing that payment 
could not be made for services using devices that had not been approved by the FDA.
159 As 
evidence of its existing policy of treating drugs and devices differently, the Secretary provided 
sample language for claim evaluations that it had given fiscal intermediaries to use in 1977: “In 
the administration of the Medicare program, we have consistently taken the position that a drug 
may be covered only where it is being used to treat a condition for which the Food and Drug 
Administration (the agency specifically charged with responsibility for approving and licensing 
drugs) has determined it is safe and effective and has approved it for general use.”
160 The court 
ultimately determined that the manual instructions were a substantive rule and therefore should 
have been subject to the notice-and-comment requirements of the APA.
161 
  One of the most important cases involving the pharmaceutical industry—and off-label 
drug marketing in particular—was Franklin v. Parke-Davis.
162 This qui tam suit under the FCA 
by a doctor (and former “medical liaison” for the company) alleged the drug manufacturer 
(acquired by Pfizer during the course of the litigation) had engaged in a fraudulent scheme to 
promote the sale of Neurontin for off-label uses and that this illegal marketing caused submission 
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of false claims to Medicaid and the VA.
163 The court emphasized that while physicians may 
prescribe an approved drug for off-label use (because the FDA’s mission is to regulate 
pharmaceuticals without interfering with the practice of medicine), a manufacturer cannot market 
or promote the drug for an unapproved use.
164 “A manufacturer illegally ‘misbrands’ a drug if 
the drug’s labeling includes information about its unapproved uses.”
165 The court further 
elaborated on the interaction between FDA approval and federal reimbursement (in this case, 
Medicaid): “Covered outpatient drugs do not include drugs that are ‘used for a medical 
indication which is not a medically accepted indication.’ [….] A medically accepted indication, 
in turn, includes a use ‘which is approved under the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act’ or 
which is included in specified drug compendia.”
166 The court found that Neurontin was not 
eligible for reimbursement under Medicaid because the off-label uses for which it was prescribed 
were not included in one of the compendia.
167 
  In Franklin, it was important that the company’s “medical liaisons,” which are normally 
connected with a manufacturer’s research functions, were employed exclusively to promote and 
sell the company’s products.
168 However, they were encouraged to misrepresent themselves to 
physicians as researchers rather than as sales representatives.
169 They were instructed to make 
“exaggerated or false claims” about both the efficacy and safety of Parke-Davis drugs
170 and to 
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coach doctors on how to submit payable claims for off-label prescriptions.
171 Additionally, many 
physicians were given kickbacks—allegedly to compensate them for drug studies (which were 
actually of little scientific value), for services as “consultants,” and for small recordkeeping 
tasks.
172 
  Although the defendant argued that the FCA could not be used as an “end-run around the 
enforcement provisions” in the FDCA, the court held that liability can be found under the FCA 
where the failure to abide by another rule or regulation becomes a “material misrepresentation” 
to receive payment from the government.
173 Even though Parke-Davis had not directly submitted 
claims for payment to the government, the court found that “an intervening force only breaks the 
causal connection when it is unforeseeable.”
174 Since the submission of Medicaid claims by 
doctors and pharmacists based on the information provided by Parke-Davis was not only 
foreseeable but also an intended consequence, liability could be found indirectly under the 
FCA.
175 However, the court rejected the claim that the defendants’ Anti-Kickback violations 
were per se violations of the FCA because Franklin did not demonstrate that Parke-Davis’ caused 
or induced a doctor or pharmacist to submit a false or fraudulent anti-kickback certification.
176 
The court warned, “This count is an example of the Relator improperly seeking to use the FCA 
as a means to enforce various regulatory proscriptions of the FDA.”
177 
  Because of the indirect nature of false claims liability for pharmaceutical manufacturers, 
courts have varied in the level of specificity required in plaintiffs’ complaints. In United States 
ex rel. Westmoreland v. Amgen, the First Circuit distinguished between standards for cases 
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alleging direct presentment of false claims to the government and ones involving indirect 
inducement.
178 In Westmoreland, the relator alleged that by overfilling its bottles, Amgen was 
providing built-in free samples of its drugs and that it marketed the potential benefits of billing 
for unnecessary and unadministered overfill dosages.
179 Additionally, he alleged that Amgen 
neglected to factor in the overfill when calculating its reported average sales prices.
180 The court 
noted that, in cases where the defendant directly presented claims to the government, a plaintiff 
“must provide details identifying particular false claims submitted,” but in situations where the 
defendant induced third parties to file false claims a “more flexible” standard applied.
181 The 
court found this standard appropriate because a plaintiff whistleblower likely would not have 
access to forms submitted by third parties prior to conducting discovery.
182 
  However, the Eleventh Circuit recently affirmed the dismissal of a qui tam case against 
Solvay Pharmaceuticals because the complaint did not plead specific false claims with sufficient 
particularity.
183 The relators alleged that Solvay and its subsidiary Unimed Pharmaceuticals had 
marketed off-label use of its synthetic marijuana compound.
184 The court stated: 
[T]he Complaint in this case offers detailed allegations of an illegal scheme to cause the 
government to pay amounts it did not owe. The Complaint also includes what the relators 
describe as ‘a highly-compelling statistical analysis [that] renders inescapable the 
conclusion that a huge number of claims for ineffective off-label uses of Marinol resulted 
from [Solvay's illegal marketing] campaign.’ But, the Complaint does not allege the 
existence of a single actual false claim. In fact, we are unable to discern from the 
complaint a specific person or entity that is alleged to have presented a claim of any kind, 
let alone a false or fraudulent claim.
185 
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Although § 3729(a)(2) of the FCA does not require proof that a false claim was actually 
submitted to the government, the court held that a plaintiff must show proof that the defendant 
made a false record or statement for the purpose of getting a false claim paid and that the false 
record or statement caused the government to actually pay a false claim (either to the defendant 
or to a third party).
186 
  Recently, courts have been more reluctant to impose FCA liability for simple off-label 
marketing. In United States ex rel. Polansky v. Pfizer in 2009, the court found that while 
advocacy for off-label use of Lipitor may have violated the FDCA and subjected Pfizer to FDA’s 
enforcement authority, the mere fact of violating FDA regulations does not translate into liability 
for false claims.
187 The court examined the “legally false” certification theory adopted by the 
Second Circuit in Mikes, but determined that Pfizer had not filed any claims for reimbursement 
nor made any implied certifications to obtain payment.
188 Polansky also did not allege that Pfizer 
had made any representations to physicians that the off-label uses were consistent with federal 
program guidelines.
189 The court further emphasized that the physicians who wrote the 
prescriptions were “not unsophisticated lay persons.”
190 Since prescribing drugs for uses not 
approved by the FDA is within the professional medical judgment of physicians, an implicit 
certification that these prescriptions were within the federal program guidelines would not make 
sense.
191 
  The 2001 settlement with TAP Pharmaceuticals, which was the largest to that date, was 
notable because it seemed to mark a sea change in the government’s treatment of pharmaceutical 
                                                        
186 Id. at 1327. 
187 United States ex rel. Polansky v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 04-CV-0704, 2009 WL 1456582, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. May 22, 
2009). 
188 Id. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 31 
manufacturers.
192 In October 2001, TAP agreed to pay $875 million to settle civil and criminal 
fraud allegations regarding the sale of the cancer drug Lupron.
193 The government alleged that 
TAP knowingly reported AWP information that was significantly higher than the average sales 
prices, which assured artificially high Medicare reimbursement.
194 They then “marketed the 
spread,” which gave physicians a financial inducement to prescribe Lupron.
195 The government 
further alleged that TAP concealed the true pricing from Medicare and falsely advised their 
customers to report the AWP rather than the actual price they paid, causing their customers to 
submit false claims.
196 The FCA allegations constituted $560 million of the total payments and 
settled two qui tam cases.
197 
  Many members of the pharmaceutical industry felt it was disingenuous to accuse a 
company of fraud for their (not unusual) use of a well-known loophole in the system.
198 
However, since other methods of revising the AWP calculations have failed, DOJ and HHS have 
turned to using fraud settlements to close this loophole.
199 
  The TAP case also demonstrated the growing use of both settlements in general (which 
may of course be a move on the part of corporations to reduce their own litigation costs) and 
Corporate Integrity Agreements (“CIA”s) in particular. The TAP CIA required the company to 
report its average sales price (“ASP”) on a quarterly basis for the duration of the agreement.
200 
Corporate integrity agreements typically run for five years and include requirements designed to 
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ensure compliance with federal program requirements.
201 The requirements generally include 
hiring a compliance officer, developing written standards and policies, conducting employee 
training, reviewing claims submitted to federal health care programs for accuracy, establishing 
programs for confidential disclosure of fraud, not employing or contracting with excluded 
individuals, and submitting annual compliance reports to OIG.
202 
  Such compliance plans became a common business practice after the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines for Organizations were implemented in 1991.
203 The Guidelines provided that a 
corporation could mitigate its sentencing for a federal criminal conviction if it had an effective 
compliance plan.
204 Prosecutors may use discretion in taking action against an organization with 
an effective compliance plan.
205 Some states have also developed standards that pharmaceutical 
companies must follow in order to do business there. For example, in 2004, California enacted a 
new law that requires pharmaceutical companies to implement a Comprehensive Compliance 
Program, which requires them to comply with the PhRMA Code and the OIG Compliance 
Program Guidelines.
206 They must also post their compliance plan along with a written 
attestation to compliance with the plan available on their website and provide a toll-free number 
where individuals may obtain copies of the information.
207 
VI.  Pfizer Settlement 
  In 2009, the TAP settlement was far surpassed in monetary value by a settlement with 
Pfizer resolving allegations of off-label marketing of a number of drugs. In the settlement 
agreement on August 31, 2009, Pfizer’s subsidiary Pharmacia & Upjohn Company, Inc., agreed 
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to enter a plea of guilty to a violation of the FDA by introducing into interstate commerce the 
misbranded drug Bextra.
208 The FDA approved Bextra in 2001 for treatment of the symptoms of 
osteoarthritis, rheumatoid arthritis, and menstrual cramps.
209 However, Pfizer marketed Bextra 
for the off-label treatment of acute pain and surgical pain and at dosages above the FDA-
approved level.
210 They created sales materials and message to promote Bextra for the off-label 
uses, commissioned market research to test the sales materials, promoted the unapproved uses 
directly to physicians, used so-called advisory boards and consultant meetings to promote Bextra 
for unapproved uses, distributed promotional samples to surgeons and other prescribers who had 
no FDA-approved use for Bextra, and sponsored CME programs to disseminate their message 
about the off-label uses.
211 
  Additionally, Pfizer settled civil claims with the federal government (for submitting 
claims for payment to Medicaid, TRICARE, the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, 
the Federal Employees Compensation Act Program, the Department of Veterans Affairs, the 
Bureau of Prisons, and Medicare) and with certain states and the District of Columbia (for 
submitting claims to Medicaid).
212 The civil settlement covered allegations of illegally promoting 
the sale and use of Bextra, Geodon, Zyvox, and Lyrica for conditions or patients not approved by 
the FDA.
213 Pfizer also allegedly paid “illegal remunerations for speaker programs, mentorships, 
preceptorships, journal clubs, and gifts (including entertainment, cash, travel and meals)” to 
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induce health care professionals to promote and prescribe Aricept, Celebrex, Lipitor, Norvasc, 
Relpax, Viagra, Zithromax, Zoloft, and Zyrtec.
214 
  John Kopchinski, a former Pfizer sales representative, was a relator in one of the qui tam 
suits resolved by the settlement.
215 He said that the company had encouraged him and others not 
to worry about the Neurontin case and encouraged them to participate in similar off-label 
marketing of Bextra.
216 Kopchinski stated, “The whole culture of Pfizer is driven by sales, and if 
you didn’t sell drugs illegally, you were not seen as a team player.”
217 
  Pfizer agreed to pay $2.3 billion to the federal government and the states involved to 
resolve the criminal and civil claims.
218 Michael K. Loucks, the acting United States attorney for 
the District of Massachusetts, said, “Among the factors we considered in calibrating this severe 
punishment was Pfizer’s recidivism.”
219 The criminal resolution included a $1.195 billion fine 
and a forfeiture of $105 million (the largest criminal fine imposed in a United States criminal 
prosecution to date).
220 The combined federal and state civil settlement was $1 billion.
221 The 
Medicaid portion of the settlement (to both the federal and state governments) was over $705 
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million.
222 The civil settlement also resolved eleven qui tam suits under the FCA.
223 The United 
States agreed to pay six relators a total of approximately $102 million.
224 
  In addition to the guilty plea and monetary settlement, Pfizer signed a Corporate Integrity 
agreement with OIG.
225 The agreement provided that Pfizer would establish and maintain a 
compliance program;
226 appoint a compliance officer to implement the compliance policies and 
procedures;
227 establish a compliance committee to support and advise the compliance officer;
228 
create an audit committee to oversee compliance with the federal health care program and FDA 
requirements;
229 implement a written code of conduct and written policies and procedures 
regarding compliance (including, among other things, the types of materials and information that 
could be distributed by the company, consulting and other arrangements, and the funding of 
grants and charitable contributions);
230 maintain and publicize its internal disclosure mechanism 
and non-retaliation policy;
231 report any probable violations of criminal, civil or administration 
laws applicable to the federal health care programs or the FDA;
232 publish on its website an 
accessible and searchable listing of all physicians or other entities who received payments 
directly or indirectly from Pfizer;
233 and submit an annual report to OIG for each the five years 
of the duration of the agreement.
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  The Pfizer settlement made the headlines because of its size, but it is also emblematic of 
the current liability environment for pharmaceutical manufacturers. Tony West, Assistant 
Attorney General for the Civil Division, stated, “Illegal conduct and fraud by pharmaceutical 
companies puts the public health at risk, corrupts medical decisions by health care providers, and 
costs the government billions of dollars […] This civil settlement and plea agreement by Pfizer 
represent yet another example of what penalties will be faced when a pharmaceutical company 
puts profits ahead of patient welfare.”
235 The government allegations against Pfizer included all 
of those discussed above—from marketing of off-label uses of its drugs to payments to 
physicians for services of questionable necessity. In many ways, Pfizer has become the “poster 
child” for pharmaceutical manufacturer liability in the United States. 
VII.  Future Implications – Medicare Part D 
  Many of the traditional marketing strategies and business practices of pharmaceutical 
companies have gone by the wayside under the statutory regime of the Anti-Kickback Statute 
and the False Claims Act. The cases discussed above, however, including the very large Pfizer 
settlement, held manufacturers liable for activities that occurred long before the creation of the 
Medicare prescription drug benefit (Part D), which could have large implications for 
pharmaceutical company liability in the future. This section will provide a brief summary of the 
creation and current status of Part D. 
  The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003
236 established the voluntary outpatient 
prescription drug benefit for people on Medicare, known as Part D, which went into effect in 
2006.
237 Some aspects of Part D were also modified by the enactment of the Patient Protection 
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and Affordable Care Act
238 and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act
239 
(collectively referred to as the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”)) passed in 2010.
240 All 47 million 
elderly and disabled Medicare beneficiaries have access to the drug benefit through private plans 
approved by the federal government, and Medicare replaced Medicaid as the source of drug 
coverage for dually eligible beneficiaries.
241 The drug benefit is offered through both stand-alone 
prescription drug plans (“PDP”s) and Medicare Advantage prescription drug (“MA-PD”) plans, 
many of which are health maintenance organizations (“HMO”s), that cover all Medicare benefits 
including drugs.
242 
  The standard benefit in 2011, for example, has a $310 deductible and 25% coinsurance 
up to the initial coverage limit of $2,840 in total drug costs, followed by a gap or “donut hole” in 
coverage where enrollees have been responsible for 100% of costs until they reach the 
catastrophic coverage limit of $6,448.
243 Beginning in 2011, however, the ACA will gradually 
lower the out-of-pocket costs in the donut hole by requiring drug manufacturers who want their 
products covered by Part D to offer a 50% discount to patients on brand-name drugs.
244 Further 
discounts on brand-name drugs and on generic equivalents will be phased in.
245 After the 
catastrophic limit, enrollees pay either 5% of total drug costs or $2.50 or $6.30 for each drug.
246 
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  Drug manufacturers who do not enter into agreements with CMS under the discount 
program will not be able to have their outpatient prescription drugs covered under Part D.
247 
CMS published a model manufacturer agreement in August 2010, which will be used with all 
manufacturers and which is not subject to individual negotiations.
248 The agreement requires 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to agree to the requirements of the program, and failure to comply 
with the program’s rules will result in a 25 percent surcharge on manufacturer liability.
249 
  The definition of a covered drug under Part D “closely follows” the definition of a 
covered drug under Medicaid in the Social Security Act.
250 Thus, “a covered Part D drug was 
available only by prescription, approved by the [FDA], used and sold in the United States, and 
used for a medically accepted indication.”
251 Medically accepted indication” is defined as a use 
approved by the FDA or included in one of the compendia.
252 This is somewhat distinct from the 
definition of “medically accepted indication” for drugs covered under Part B, which also 
includes indications that are published in peer-reviewed literature.
253 
  The addition of Medicare Part D has so far increased program outlays considerably, 
accounting for two thirds of the $72 billion increase in spending from 2005 to 2006.
254 Thus, the 
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government’s interest in cutting down on fraud by pharmaceutical manufacturers is sure to only 
increase.
255 
VIII.  Conclusion 
  The track of the evolution of pharmaceutical manufacturer liability for health care fraud 
over the past two decades has been rapid and increasing. Many of the practices that drug 
companies formerly engaged in, such as directly marketing and providing gifts to physicians, are 
no longer permissible, and others, such as compensating health care providers for consulting or 
research services, have come under close scrutiny. Furthermore, the methods that manufacturers 
use to report prices to the federal health care programs are watched closely, and the government 
has used the fraud and abuse statutes to further curtail off-label marketing. 
  The basic statutory regime that premises health care fraud liability on violations of the 
Anti-Kickback Statute and the False Claims Act has been shaped through several decades of case 
law to form an environment in which pharmaceutical companies ultimately pay huge sums of 
money to settle criminal and civil allegations. The Pfizer settlement in particular demonstrates 
the types of activities and the financial costs at stake. Importantly, this kind of liability will likely 
only increase for pharmaceutical manufacturers as the Medicare Part D benefit continues to be 
implemented. 
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